a business education the explanations may afford some assistance. It does not seem to the reviewer, however, that this is the best method of stating the law of negotiable instruments for beginners or even for business men. The text exposition, with forms, examples, and illustrations emphasizing the important principles and leaving details to be supplied by the text of the act itself, is much more vivid and readable.

The author has also included a brief synopsis of the law of collections and the acts governing bills of lading, warehouse receipts, and the transfer of certificates of stock, although here again one may question some of the propositions laid down, such as the statement that one purchasing lost or stolen certificates acquires no right to the certificates even when they are endorsed in blank. (9 California Law Review 186, 16 Illinois Law Review 89, 6 Minnesota Law Review 89.)

A. M. Kidd.

LEGAL REASONING AND BRIEFING. By Jesse Franklin Brumbaugh. The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Indianapolis, 1917, pp. xvi, 775.

The introductory chapters include the rules of logic with frequent illustrations from the law. Then there are chapters on legal interpretation and some good suggestions for estimating the value of a case. Attention is directed to the weight of California decisions in code states, although one scarcely recognizes the great codifier under the name "Charles Dudley Field" which the author gives him (page 247). In the chapter on witnesses there is little that is new, the modern development of psychology is hardly referred to, and some of the conclusions of the author are of doubtful validity, such as, for example, the statement that "the perfect example of an artless witness is the innocent testimony of a child." This is only true, if at all, on the supposition that the child is really innocent. In most cases, under coaching and suggestion, it is impossible for the child to remember and discriminate between what actually happened and what the child has been told has happened.

The chapter on estimation of delivery may be valuable, but the impression on the reviewer was that it held up the "bush-league orator" of a former generation as the model to follow; but let the author speak for himself: "For this reason the hair should be brushed loosely high across the forehead, and under no condition should it be parted into two simpering curls from the middle. Such details are symptomatic of a tea-party mind. There should be the results of toilet, but none of its ostentations. The collar should neither be conspicuously high nor too low and never of the negligee pattern. The latter is appropriately adapted to outdoor life where great freedom of movement is essential and where physical labor is required — the speaker who presumes to exhibit the character of rugged and honest simplicity by appearing before his auditors in the costume of the field or workshop is playing an exceedingly cheap role which can never cover up his lack of the real quality. Simplicity he should have, but simplicity is not disappropriateness, and

it is not rawness—it should be a dignified simplicity. Thus nothing surpasses the plain black tie of a size relative to the proportions of its wearer." If the reader likes the above sample, there is plenty more in the book.

To a student of law studying for himself and with a limited library the book contains considerable information, and might be useful as a concise encyclopaedia.

A. M. Kidd.

A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW. By Roland R. Foulke. The John C. Winston Co., Philadelphia, 1920. Vol. I, pp. lxxxviii, 481; vol. II, pp. 518.

Mr. Foulke declares war on the ordinary division of peace, war and neutrality, substitutes therefor two main divisions, substantive and remedial international law, and hopes "he has succeeded in a more logical arrangement than that commonly found in the writers." While the commonly accepted divisions are susceptible of improvement, the author has made no fundamental change. All he has done is to include the topics generally covered by the laws of peace under substantive international law, and the topics of war and neutrality under remedial international law. The analogies made between public and private law are frequently overdrawn. This is clearly the case where the author has attempted to apply private law groupings to public international law.

The author begins the discussion with an introductory essay on the definition and nature of the laws of human conduct. While of value in a book on jurisprudence or the theory of the law, one is compelled, after examination, to question its place in a treatise on international law.

On page 69 of Volume II we find the following: "The so-called doctrine of non-intervention simply means that no state shall interfere in the internal affairs of another state, and cannot be applicable to intervention when used as meaning the exertion of pressure against a state as the external factor in determining the international conduct of that state." The history of the non-intervention principle in the United States has for a century or more applied to limitations upon the external as well as the internal sovereignty of states. Moreover, the United States, in defending this principle, has been compelled to take measures of control amounting in effect to intervention in the external affairs of certain states. The author does not bring out clearly the distinction between political intervention and intervention for the pressure of claims of citizens against foreign governments, commonly known as diplomatic intervention.

On page 232, Volume II, the author states that "the recent writers appear to have laid too much stress on the conventions, particularly those of the Hague, supposing them to have a binding force which it turns out they do not possess." This criticism of writers on the Hague conventions is, in the opinion of the reviewer, unjustified. If nations meet in conference to codify international law, and to reduce to definite rules that which hitherto has been